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ABSTRACT   
The foundational international business (IB) scholarship grappled with whether multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are largely efficiency-enhancing or market-power inducing institutions. 
Contemporary scholarship, however, often associates foreign direct investment (FDI) with 
efficiency-enhancing properties and thus neglects the market-power interpretation of the MNE. 
Such an imbalance is problematic given that the theoretical and empirical justifications behind 
the field’s embrace of the efficiency interpretation are not fully evident. Instead, both efficiency 
and market-power effects are seemingly present in cross-border investment activity. Based on a 
comprehensive sample of up to 4,361 cross-border investments materializing between 1986 and 
2010, we present theoretically-grounded hypotheses with regard to when market-power effects 
will tend to dominate efficiency effects. We find that cross-border investments undertaken by 
emerging-market MNEs in both developed and emerging markets tend to involve substantial 
efficiency effects and minimal market-power effects when compared with the cross-border 
investments undertaken by developed-country MNEs in both developed and emerging markets.  
 
Keywords: Emerging markets, FDI, International Acquisitions, Multinational Enterprise, Theory 
of FDI. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The question of “why do multinational enterprises (MNEs) exist?” plays a central role in the 
theory of the MNE (Forsgren, 2013). The earliest answer to this question came from Stephen 
Hymer (1976 [1960]) who declared that MNEs arise when firms are unable to exploit their 
monopolistic ownership advantages via market-based trading relationships, and decide to bypass 
imperfect market mechanisms by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI). This market-
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power interpretation of the MNE avers that firms derive their ownership advantages by 
internalizing structural market-imperfections that exist to the extent that the industrial-level 
market structures for final products deviate from effective competition (Bain, 1956). Building on 
this premise, the market-power interpretation views FDI as a vehicle to project market power, 
extend market dominance and capture value from consumers across multiple national markets 
(Dunning and Pitelis, 2008). Accordingly, the spread of MNEs via FDI ultimately runs the 
danger of stifling local competition and harming consumer welfare (Hymer, 1970, 1971, 1979 
[1968]). 
In contrast, subsequent scholars – while accepting Hymer’s insight that MNEs and 
markets represent alternative institutions to facilitate value-added activities across borders – 
shifted their focus away from market-power considerations and moved towards an efficiency 
interpretation of the MNE. The most influential of which is internalization theory which holds 
that ownership advantages stem from the MNE’s superior ability to economize on the transaction 
costs arising from natural market-imperfections. As Dunning and Rugman (1985) observe, 
natural market-imperfections ensue from the inadequacies involved with market pricing under 
the context of uncertainty and bounded rationality. Here, the analytical focus shifts away from 
the final market structure and toward imperfections in intermediate-goods markets, especially 
those associated with the transfer of valuable tacit-knowledge such as proprietary technology and 
organizational know-how (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982). Following Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1985), MNEs exist in order to reorganize imperfect external markets within 
firm boundaries and create more perfect internal markets. Under the efficiency interpretation of 
the MNE, FDI is thus generally associated with positive welfare outcomes as MNEs exist to the 
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extent that they are more efficient vehicles than alternate arrangements to economize on the 
transaction costs arising from natural imperfections (Dunning and Pitelis, 2008; Pitelis, 2002).  
An even stronger case for efficiency effects comes from what can be broadly labelled as 
the organizational capability literature which views ownership advantage as stemming from the 
MNEs’ superior ability to transfer capabilities, create innovations and spur new markets across 
borders (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Madhok, 1997). As Kogut and Zander (1993, p. 637) 
underscore, “the primary explanation for [foreign] direct investment is the possession 
of…superior capabilities…responsible for the growth of the firm across international borders”. 
The organizational capability view departs from both the market-power view and internalization 
theory by rejecting imperfect markets as a relevant premise; instead, this view avers that market 
“co-creation functions are not merely a response to a market that has somehow failed…(but)…it 
is often the case that the market has quite simply failed to emerge and needs to be created…by 
entrepreneurially managed business enterprises” (Teece, 2014, p. 12). The rent accrued to MNEs 
in this scenario is entrepreneurial rather than monopolistic in nature; and MNEs exist to the 
extent that they are more efficient at spurring innovation, co-creating value and transmitting 
valuable tacit knowledge across borders (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Teece, 2014). Accordingly, 
the organizational capability view – akin to internalization theory – generally associates MNEs 
and FDI with efficiency-enhancing behavior that ultimately leads to positive welfare outcomes. 
 The above discussion naturally begs the question of whether “MNEs are largely creatures 
of market-power or efficiency?” That is, do MNEs tend to increase social welfare by 
economizing on transaction costs, creating new markets, and facilitating innovation (à la the 
efficiency interpretation); or do they tend to decrease social welfare by stifling competition at the 
expense of consumer welfare (à la the market-power interpretation)? While some declare that the 
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focus on market power is “little more than a distraction” (Teece, 2006, p. 126), others caution 
that a more realistic conclusion would be for market-power and efficiency effects to coexist and 
manifest at different strengths under different contexts (Buckley and Casson, 2009). Indeed, 
there is no a priori theoretical reason to ascertain which effect dominates, and reviews of 
available empirical evidence reach similar conclusions (e.g., Blomström and Kokko, 1997; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Lall, 1979). Forsgren (2013) underscores this point when he urges 
contemporary scholarship to go beyond strictly considering the presence of efficiency effects and 
also consider market-power effects since  “multinational firms are in an especially favourable 
position to reduce competition in the market” (p. 56). The contemporary literature’s adoption of 
efficiency effects as a default assumption is also consistent with the general observation that 
international business (IB) scholarship has not fulfilled its potential in terms of advancing our 
understanding of the nexus between MNEs and social welfare (Eden and Lenway, 2001; Ghauri 
and Yamin, 2009; Meyer, 2004).  
Against this backdrop, our aim is to evaluate the relative presence of market-power and 
efficiency effects associated with cross-border investment activity and ascertain whether the 
balance between these effects substantially varies in the cross-national context for FDI. We take 
such an approach as foundational IB scholarship (e.g., Wells, 1983) held that variation in 
country-pair types may help explain the balance between market-power and efficiency effects. 
For instance, adherents of the market-power interpretation of the MNE (e.g., Hymer, 1970, 1971; 
Lall, 1978, 1979) argued that emerging-market nations were most vulnerable with respect to 
MNE market-power. Furthermore, Hymer (1970) posited that cross-border investment 
undertaken by emerging-market MNEs (EM-MNEs) may yield substantial efficiency effects. In a 
more contemporary study, Blonigen and Wang (2004) theoretically justify and empirically 
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establish the inappropriateness of pooling across different country-pair types. Namely, FDI 
determinants vary systematically between emerging markets and developed countries, as FDI 
does not play the same role in emerging markets as it does in developed countries. In addition, a 
number of IB scholars (e.g., Clougherty and Grajek, 2008; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Ricart 
et al., 2004; Sethi et al., 2003) have found it fundamental to differentiate – both theoretically and 
empirically – between developed and emerging countries when examining FDI.  
We will consider then whether the tendencies regarding the balance between efficiency 
and market-power effects in cross-border investment activity are consistent across four different 
country-pair types: from developed countries to emerging markets (DCEM); between 
developed countries (DCDC); from emerging markets to developed countries (EMDC); and 
between emerging-market countries (EMEM). In order to follow through on these aims, we 
organize the remainder of the paper in the following manner: we first establish that market-
power and efficiency effects are most accurately conceptualized as coexisting in all cross-border 
investment activities (i.e., they are not best analyzed as independent phenomena). Second, we 
forward three hypotheses pertaining to when market-power effects will tend to dominate 
efficiency effects. Third, we describe the methodology employed to test these theoretical priors 
and interpret the empirical results. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications, 
limitations, and avenues for future research that can extend the insights of the current study. 
 
INTEGRATING MARKET-POWER & EFFICIENCY EFFECTS 
Before delving into an integration of market-power and efficiency effects, it behooves us to 
further ground these concepts in the pre-existing management literature. First, the market-power 
interpretation focuses on the MNE’s ability to capture value from consumers and strengthen 
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market dominance across national borders (Dunning and Pitelis, 2008; Pitelis, 2002). In line with 
Hymer (1970, 1971), market-power effects are manifested by the MNE’s ability to better dictate 
final-product prices as a result of their transferring ownership advantages internationally. In this 
view, industrial-level market imperfections generate the ownership advantages necessary for 
internationalization, and internationalization in turn leads to further structural imperfections that 
will generate greater profits for MNEs. Thus from a welfare perspective, the rise of an MNE has 
the ability to increase industry concentration, reduce competition, compromise allocative 
efficiency, and ultimately decrease consumer welfare (Hymer, 1971).  
The efficiency interpretation of the MNE instead rests on the MNEs ability to efficiently 
organize transactions (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981), safeguard contractual hazards 
(Hennart, 2007), spur innovation (Hennart, 1982), and create/share organizational know-how 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993). Importantly, ownership advantage in the efficiency interpretation is a 
function of endogenous processes that crystalize within firm boundaries rather than exogenous 
industry-level structural imperfections. Market power accrued in the process of firm growth is 
considered to be a derivative rather than a cause of ownership advantage, and any resulting 
inefficiencies represent static byproducts on the way toward dynamic efficiency (Dunning and 
Pitelis, 2008; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 2014). Following this logic, MNEs arise when firm-specific 
assets cannot be transacted efficiently across borders via the price system (Buckley and Casson, 
1976) or when valuable firm-specific knowledge – often tacit in nature – is more efficiently 
created and transmitted through the MNE (Hennart, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1993). Under the 
efficiency interpretation, the analytical focus shifts away from industrial-level market structure 
for the final product (as in the market-power interpretation) and toward the natural market 
imperfections inherent in intermediate-goods markets and the internal dynamics that make 
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MNEs superior vehicles to transmit and create knowledge across borders (Buckley and Casson, 
1976; Hennart, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1993). The consequent welfare implications of FDI 
under the efficiency interpretation are generally positive as MNEs enhance welfare via effective 
transnational dissemination of innovations, reduction of societal inefficiencies, creation of new 
values, and minimization of transaction costs (Caves, 1974). 
As already alluded to in our discussions above, a number of IB scholars (e.g., Blomström 
and Kokko, 1997; Buckley and Casson, 2009; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Forsgren, 2013; Lall, 
1979) have called for analysis that integrates both market-power and efficiency effects. In fact, 
there exists a broader literature within management (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1999; Oxley et 
al., 2009; Porter, 1985; Walter and Barney, 1990) that considers the coexistence of market-power 
and efficiency effects as relevant factors in economic exchange. Hymer (1979 [1968]) also 
recognized that FDI involves both market-power and efficiency effects, though his work placed 
stronger emphasis on market-power effects. For example, Hymer (1979 [1968]) was aware that 
MNEs offer superior internal markets for certain types of transactions thereby involving 
efficiency effects, but he predicted that MNEs ultimately engage in profit-maximizing collusion 
which leads to market-power effects.  
The preceding theoretical discussion illustrates that integrating efficiency and market-
power effects is important yet challenging, as the manifestation of market power may actually be 
a consequence of efficiency-based activity and vice versa (Walter and Barney, 1990). Indeed, a 
number of scholars (e.g., Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; Clougherty and Duso, 2011; Lubatkin, 
1983; McGahan and Porter, 1999; Seth, 1990) recognize that investment activity can lead to 
synergies based on both market-power and efficiency effects. In an effort to analyze market-
power and efficiency effects in an integrated manner, we will build upon Gugler et al. (2003)’s 
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methodological approach for identifying whether market-power or efficiency effects dominate in 
particular transactions.  
Figure I illustrates the Gugler et al. (2003) methodological approach that considers post-
investment changes in sales and profits for merging firms in order to classify merger activity into 
four-distinct transaction types. Quadrant 3 depicts investment activity where market-power 
effects dominate efficiency effects. In line with Hymer (1970, 1971), strong market-power 
effects are based on the MNE’s ability to better dictate final-product prices in the years 
subsequent to the cross-border investment so as to enhance profits. Thus, a post-transaction 
environment where merging firms can simultaneously increase profits and contract output 
indicates relatively strong market-power effects. Quadrant 2 depicts investment activity where 
efficiency effects dominate market-power effects. In line with previous scholarship (e.g., 
Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1993), strong efficiency effects 
are based on the MNE’s ability to tap into synergies which enhance cross-border commercial 
activity without harming social welfare in the years subsequent to the cross-border investment. 
Accordingly, a post-merger environment where the output of merging firms increases and profits 
decrease indicates the presence of relatively strong efficiency effects. Lastly, quadrants 1 and 4 
depict investment activity where it is indeterminate with respect to whether efficiency or market-
power effects dominate in such transactions. While both market-power and efficiency effects 
surely manifest in such transactions, Gugler et al. (2003) note that assigning a clear net-effect is 
challenging for transactions with such outcomes. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE I ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
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Thus while contemporary IB scholarship has largely coalesced on the efficiency 
interpretation of the MNE, we wholeheartedly agree with Buckley and Casson’s (2009) 
observation that a more balanced approach that encompasses both market-power and efficiency 
effects is warranted. This more encompassing perspective is shared by a number of IB scholars 
(e.g., Blomström and Kokko, 1997; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Forsgren, 2013; Lall, 1979) as 
well as by scholars within the greater management literature (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1999; 
Oxley et al., 2009; Porter, 1985; Walter and Barney, 1990). Such a view recognizes an empirical 
reality where market-power and efficiency effects will coexist and manifest, to different degrees, 
in each and every cross-border transaction. The next step in scholarship then is to generate 
formal expectations regarding the balance between market-power and efficiency effects in cross-
border investment activity; in particular, theoretically-grounded hypotheses regarding when 
market-power effects might dominate efficiency effects are called for—a task to which our next 
section turns.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
We aim to consider whether the presence of market-power and efficiency effects in foreign-
investment activity varies substantially in the cross-national context. In particular, we desire to 
understand whether the balance between these competing effects involves considerable 
differences across four country-pair types: foreign-investment activity from developed countries 
to emerging markets (DCEM); foreign investment between developed countries (DCDC); 
foreign investment from emerging markets to developed countries (EMDC); and foreign 
investment between emerging-market countries (EMEM). 
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While the general tendencies regarding the balance between market-power and efficiency 
effects might involve a good deal of heterogeneity across the four country-pair types, it is well 
known by scholars (e.g., Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007) that the majority 
of cross-border investment activity takes place between developed countries. For instance, 78.1% 
of our sampled cross-border acquisitions occur in DCDC country-pairs. It is no surprise then 
that the theoretical and empirical literature in IB tends to concentrate on FDI flows between 
developed countries. Yet as already noted, the foundational IB scholarship (e.g., Hymer, 1970, 
1971; Lall, 1978, 1979) expressed particular concerns with regard to DCEM investment 
involving substantial market-power effects. For this reason, we will consider DCEM country-
pairs to be the benchmark for establishing whether the cross-border transactions in other country-
pair types involve relatively stronger (weaker) efficiency (market-power) effects. In particular, 
we will conjecture as to whether the cross-border investments taking place between the DCDC, 
EMEM, and EMDC country-pairs involve substantially different tendencies in terms of the 
balance between market-power and efficiency effects as compared to DCEM investments. In 
addition to these considerations, we can also implicitly factor whether the DCDC, EMEM, 
and EMDC country-pairs involve ordinal differences in terms of the balance between market-
power and efficient effects. Namely, the ordering of these country-pair types (DCEM, 
DCDC, EMEM, and EMDC) is intentional, as it reflects a prioris with regard to 
successively weaker market-power effects and stronger efficiency effects.  
 
DCDC Cross-Border Investments 
Political institutions play a fundamental role in ensuring that economic activity primarily 
involves efficiency enhancing properties that ultimately lead to enhanced social welfare (North, 
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1990). When it comes to FDI activity, the national institutions of host countries are charged with 
ensuring that anti-competitive investments (where market-power effects swamp efficiency 
effects) do not arise. For example, the regulation of investment activity via effective negotiation 
of bilateral investment treaties (e.g., Jandhyala et al., 2011) and via the enforcement of 
competition policies (e.g., Brewer, 1993) can ensure that market-power effects do not 
substantially manifest in inward FDI. Yet, Vernon (1973, p. 117) observed that “(the) institutions 
which are expected to provide the countervailing force to the multinational enterprise – the 
national governments, the national labor unions, and the national press – are often engaged in an 
unbalanced game” as MNEs are in a unique position to ‘shop around’ for the best place to locate 
their productive assets (see also Johnson, 1970; Vernon, 1971, 1972). In essence, early IB 
scholarship envisioned that the bargaining power between MNEs and national governments was 
a central factor in determining whether market-power effects dominated in cross-border 
investment activity. 
 While a number of positive effects have derived from host governments taking on pro-
FDI policies (Dunning, 1998), the potential for downside is also present. In particular, some 
contemporary scholars (e.g., Thomas, 2010) have picked up on Vernon’s (1971, 1972, 1973) 
observations and surmised that bargaining-power imbalances have led to a sort of location-
tournament process best characterizing the interactions between MNEs and host governments. 
Under this dynamic, host governments must aggressively compete against each other in order to 
attract inward FDI. Even more concerning is the observation by UNCTAD (1997, p. 159) that 
governments have increasingly offered MNEs “arrangements that grant market power with legal 
protection against competition in exchange for investment” in order to gain an upper hand in 
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these location tournaments. Such an observation highlights the potential for substantial market-
power effects. 
 Within this context of vigorous competition for inward FDI, it is important to point out 
that developed host countries may be less subject to pernicious market-power effects from 
inward FDI as compared to emerging-market host countries. In particular, the quality and state of 
institutions in developed countries fundamentally differs from that in emerging-market countries 
(Meyer and Peng, 2016; Narula, 2012). Developed countries often have the market-supporting 
institutions – such as property-rights protection, third-party contract enforcement, transparent 
financial markets and effective competition policies – that are customarily less present in 
emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; North, 1990; Wright, et al., 
2005). Furthermore, DC-MNEs possess the proprietary reputations, technologies and capital that 
emerging-market governments find so necessary for economic development; yet, developed-
country governments will not be so beholden to DC-MNEs as their proprietary resources and 
capabilities are less critical for developed countries (Eden et al., 2005). Accordingly, the 
institutional actors in developed host countries do not experience the substantial power 
asymmetries vis-à-vis DC-MNEs that the institutional actors in emerging-market host countries 
often experience.  
The passages above suggest then that developed countries have less need to incentivize 
inward FDI; thus, developed-country governments will be less likely to engage in aggressive 
measures to attract FDI. Furthermore, Thomas (2010) observes that the presence of advanced 
institutions in developed countries eases the burden on foreign investors; hence, the additional 
host-government incentives which are required in emerging markets will not be required in 
developed countries. For instance, Luo (2001, p. 409) observes that emerging-market 
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governments often intentionally generate “unnatural market imperfections by granting monopoly 
power or position to foreign companies.” Developed countries, on the other hand, tend to engage 
in fewer arbitrary ‘bends of the rules’ that govern foreign-investment activity, which in turn 
favors relatively large efficiency effects – and relatively small market-power effects – in 
DCDC cross-border investment activity. 
In fact, Hymer (1970, 1979 [1968]) similarly observed that MNEs held significant 
bargaining-power advantages vis-à-vis national governments and that this was particularly the 
case for cross-border investments in emerging-market nations undertaken by DC-MNEs. In his 
view, emerging-market nations lacked the resources and capabilities necessary for development 
of indigenous industries; hence, emerging markets were reliant on DC-MNEs to provide such 
resources and capabilities. This dependence on DC-MNEs in turn compromised the bargaining 
power of the governments and other actors in emerging markets (Hymer and Resnick, 1969). 
Accordingly, this imbalance between MNEs and host-governments would be particularly acute 
when DC-MNEs invest in emerging markets, and much less relevant when DC-MNEs invest in 
developed countries (Ietto-Gilles, 2002). 
Building on the above foundations regarding the presence of strong institutions and 
adequate bargaining power in developed countries, we contend that cross-border investments in 
developed countries undertaken by DC-MNEs are more likely to generate relatively strong 
efficiency effects and relatively weak market-power effects as compared to DC-MNE 
investments in emerging markets. Thus, our first hypothesis can be set out as follows: 
H1: As compared to DCEM cross-border investments, DCDC cross-border investments will 
tend to be characterized by relatively strong efficiency effects and relatively weak market-power 
effects (i.e., efficiency effects will tend to dominate market-power effects). 
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EMEM Cross-Border Investments 
Over the last decade there has been considerable expansion in outward FDI by emerging-market 
MNEs (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Luo and Tung, 2007). The rise of EM-MNEs has created 
significant debate within the IB literature as to whether EM-MNEs are fundamentally different 
than DC-MNEs and whether current IB theory can adequately and accurately explain and predict 
the behavior of EM-MNEs within existing theoretical frameworks (Alon et al., 2011; Hennart, 
2012; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Mathews, 2006; Meyer, 2004; Narula, 2012; Pananond, 2015; 
Ramamurti, 2012; Wells, 1983). Underpinning the theory of the MNE is that multinationals 
possess ownership – or firm specific – advantages (i.e., capabilities, technologies, brands, etc.) 
that allow compensating for the additional costs incurred when operating in foreign markets 
(Dunning, 1998). Emerging-market firms, however, have not traditionally been deemed to 
possess sufficient ownership advantages that would allow international expansion.  
Yet, recent IB scholarship suggests that EM-MNEs possess nontraditional ownership 
advantages that are created when operating in underdeveloped institutional environments. For 
example, Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2011) argue that EM-MNEs are characterized by 
substantial non-market advantages that facilitate operating in emerging markets. These non-
market advantages involve the “resources that the firm develops and uses to interact with and 
operate in its environment, such as knowledge of the local language and customs or 
understanding of laws and regulations” (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2011, p. 444). Such 
advantages can enhance access to resources that would otherwise be unavailable to foreign 
MNEs (Hennart, 2012). These advantages thus facilitate entry into other emerging markets since 
EM-MNEs already possess many of the non-market advantages required to navigate the 
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institutional voids characteristic of these markets (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Considering the 
tremendous untapped potential that is innate to most emerging markets, the successful transfer of 
appropriate technologies and organizational know-how by EM-MNEs into emerging markets can 
generate outcomes with substantial efficiency effects (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Taking these arguments to a more granular level, research suggests that EM-MNEs often 
transfer labor-intensive technologies that are more suitable for the conditions in emerging 
markets (UNCTAD, 2006). In essence, EM-MNEs transfer technologies that are labor intensive 
and less tacit in nature to emerging markets. Transferring basic technologies in this context 
makes sense as emerging-market firms often lack the absorptive capacity necessary for the 
advanced production technologies characteristic of DC-MNEs (Aitken et al., 1996; Cantwell, 
1993). Accordingly, EM-MNEs expend fewer resources and encounter lower internationalization 
difficulties when making investments in emerging markets; thus, they are better positioned than 
DC-MNEs to leverage their unique ownership advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). 
These general patterns regarding EMEM investment also align well with recent theorizing on 
internationalization motives (e.g., Benito, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015), as EM-MNE 
investments in emerging markets tend to be market-seeking in nature; i.e., these EM-MNEs are 
motivated by the desire to sell more products and increase revenue via international expansion 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015). Successfully following through on these internationalization 
motives will lead then to operational expansion and scale economies which directly imply 
efficiency gains. In line with the above priors, several studies find that EM-MNEs are more 
present in emerging markets than are DC-MNEs, and that this is particularly the case in 
emerging markets with extensive institutional voids (Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008).  
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Turning to an analysis of the potential market-power effects involved with EMEM 
investment, it is fair to first observe that the bargaining power of EM-MNEs is limited in such a 
context. Given the nature of EM-MNE ownership advantages, the bargaining power of EM-
MNEs vis-à-vis host governments in emerging markets will tend to be lower as compared to the 
bargaining power of DC-MNEs (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984). In particular, EM-
MNEs generally do not have the advanced resources and capabilities (e.g., technology, capital, 
brands, etc.) which DC-MNEs have and which are so fundamental to the developmental needs of 
emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Narula, 2012). The limited bargaining power of EM-
MNEs vis-à-vis emerging-market host governments suggests that EM-MNEs will be unable to 
secure the preferential legal arrangements (e.g., privileged access to scarce resources, protection 
again competition) and the influence over local partners (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Lee et al., 
1998; Yan and Gray, 2001) which in turn generate substantial market-power effects. As a result, 
several studies have posited that cross-border investments between emerging-market nations are 
less likely to involve outcomes involving substantial market-power effects as compared to 
investments by DC-MNEs in emerging markets (UNCTAD, 2006; Wells, 1983, 1998). 
In sum, the cross-border investments by EM-MNEs in other emerging markets will tend 
to be characterized by substantial efficiency effects and minimal market-power effects. First, 
EM-MNEs are configured to the demands of emerging markets and can thus cope with the 
institutional voids characteristic of emerging host countries; thus, they are better equipped than 
DC-MNEs to transfer appropriate technologies, seize the available opportunities, and engage in 
the necessary market co-creation functions that lead to substantial efficiency effects. Second, 
EM-MNEs do not generally possess the types of ownership advantages (e.g., sophisticated 
technologies, advanced capabilities and established brands) that yield substantial bargaining 
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power advantages vis-à-vis host governments that in turn lead to the concessions which generate 
substantial market-power effects. Building on the above foundations, we posit that cross-border 
investments undertaken by EM-MNEs in emerging markets (i.e., EMEM) are more likely to 
generate relatively strong efficiency effects and relatively weak market-power effects as 
compared to the cross-border investments undertaken by DC-MNEs in emerging markets (i.e., 
DCEM). Thus, our second hypothesis can be set out as follows: 
H2: As compared to DCEM cross-border investments, EMEM cross-border investments will 
tend to be characterized by relatively strong efficiency effects and relatively weak market-power 
effects (i.e., efficiency effects will tend to dominate market-power effects). 
 
EMDC Cross-Border Investments  
In addition to being important destinations for FDI, emerging markets have increasingly become 
important sources of inward FDI for developed countries (UNCTAD, 2006). A number of 
scholars have responded to these developments by examining the rationales and motivations 
behind EM-MNE investment in developed countries (e.g., Buckley et al., 2007; Guillen and 
Garcia-Canal, 2009; Meyer, 2015). The dominant hypothesis in this literature is that EM-MNEs 
invest in developed countries in order to overcome their latecomer disadvantages (Luo and Tung, 
2007). Accordingly, the overriding aim of EM-MNEs is to enhance their overall competitiveness 
as they seek to gain access to resources and capabilities that lead to enhanced efficiency and 
productivity upgrading. Recent scholarship points out that efficiency-enhancing investments are 
imperative for EM-MNEs, as otherwise they will be unable to thrive in both home and foreign 
markets since they face increasing competition from DC-MNEs in these markets (Guillen and 
Garcia-Canal, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Meyer, 2015; Narula, 2006, 2012). 
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 We can provide some grounded examples of the above dynamics. For instance, Meyer 
(2015) illustrates how the Tata Group – an Indian based multinational conglomerate – acquired 
technologically advanced businesses (i.e., Corus Steel and Jaguar Land Rover) in the United 
Kingdom with little intent to reduce costs or integrate the businesses. Instead, Tata’s main 
motivation was to learn how to manage luxury brands and build managerial capabilities that 
would enhance the group’s global competitiveness. EM-MNE investments in developed 
countries are then primarily a search for advanced capabilities that allow emerging-market firms 
to conduct higher value-added activities (Pananond, 2015; UNCTAD, 2006). Similarly, Child 
and Rodrigues (2005) observe that Chinese multinationals investing in developed countries tend 
to prioritize learning which in turn leads to productivity upgrading and enhanced efficiency. 
Accordingly, EMDC cross border investments can be largely viewed as learning experiences 
which ultimately yield productivity upgrading and enhanced operational efficiency (Gubbi et al., 
2010).  
 More generally, the motivation behind EMDC investment activity is consistent with 
Penrose’s (1959) point that firms seek out new resources that reside outside a firm’s existing 
boundaries, and that this is particularly the case when firm-specific assets are undervalued due to 
a lack of complementary assets. Emerging-market firms often experience substantial imbalances 
with their asset portfolios, as they possess abundant tangible assets (e.g., access to cheap labor 
and growing markets) but lack the intangible assets which are necessary in order to make full use 
of their asset portfolio (Moon and Roehl, 2001). Developed-country firms, on the other hand, 
tend to possess valuable intangibles in the form of proprietary brands, capabilities, and 
technologies. EMDC cross-border investments consequently enable the combination of 
developed-country intangible resources with emerging-market tangible resources—a 
20 
 
redeployment of resources that allows emerging-market firms to redress the imbalances present 
with their previous asset portfolios (Buckley et al., 2014). For instance, Arçelik – a Turkish 
white-goods manufacturer – acquired several European companies with advanced technologies 
and solid brands, and then enhanced its competitiveness by combining these assets with its low-
cost manufacturing in Turkey and access to growing Middle Eastern markets (Bonaglia et al., 
2007). This potential for strong complementarities between the asset portfolios of emerging-
market and developed-country firms explains why empirical studies generally find that EMDC 
cross-border investments substantially improve firm performance (e.g., Buckley et al., 2014; 
Gubbi et al., 2010; Guo and Clougherty, 2015; Guo et al., 2016; Lecraw, 1993).  
 In addition to the potential for EM-MNE investments in developed countries to yield 
substantial transaction-based efficiency effects, access to developed countries can also help EM-
MNEs overcome the limitations involved with their home-country institutional environments 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015).  Investing in developed countries allows EM-MNEs to take 
advantage of institutional environments where there are better tax regimes, more stable 
currencies, and enhanced corporate-governance practices (Boateng et al., 2008). For example, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) illustrate that cross-border mergers can increase in value 
when acquirers from countries with less-developed corporate governance standards voluntarily 
comply with the target country’s improved governance standards. Similarly, Bhagat et al. (2011) 
and Khanna and Palepu (2004) found positive valuation effects when emerging-market acquirers 
voluntarily bootstrap themselves to the improved governance standards of target firms. These 
findings support the argument that EM-MNE investment in developed countries is driven in part 
by a search for better governance and institutional conditions which in turn enhance the 
efficiency of these emerging-market firms (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2008). 
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In addition to the obvious implications regarding efficiency effects, the dominant learning 
motive of EM-MNEs investing in developed countries also involves substantial market-power 
implications. First, it is important to underscore that market-power effects require merging firms 
to reduce capacity and output (Farrel and Shapiro, 1990). If the merging firms were to not 
rationalize production, then the fundamental supply and demand conditions within the industry 
would not be altered and there would be no consequent increase in final-product prices; i.e., no 
market-power effects would result (Tirole, 1992). Yet, EM-MNEs have been observed to be 
quite reluctant to eliminate operations and fire personnel in acquired developed-country firms 
(Kumar, 2009). In light of the dominant learning motive characteristic of EM-MNE investment 
in developed countries (Luo and Tung, 2007), this reluctance to eliminate personnel and 
shutdown operations is quite intuitive since the learning function would be substantially impaired 
if such actions were taken (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Most obviously, EM-MNEs cannot 
learn from personnel and/or operations that have been eliminated. In addition, the disruptions to 
organizational cohesiveness from such actions would interfere with a well-functioning 
organizational environment and compromise the ability to learn. It is no surprise then that EM-
MNEs are reported to make bare-minimum changes to the developed-country firms which they 
acquire (Kumar, 2009). While taking such a light touch is optimal in terms of preserving a 
learning environment for EM-MNE acquirers, it does involve some implications with regard to 
the reaping of market-power effects. In essence, the lack of rationalization and elimination of 
duplicities between the merging firms means that it will be virtually impossible to reap 
substantial market-power effects. Preserving the developed-country firm does then involve a 
substantial cost, as keeping operations at pre-merger capacity means that output in the market 
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will not be reduced and in turn final-product prices will not increase in the years subsequent to 
the investment. 
Summarizing the above reasoning, we posit that market-power effects will tend to be 
quite minimal and efficiency effects quite extensive for EMDC investment activity. First, 
EMDC investments are generally motivated by the EM-MNEs need to seek out 
complementary assets that strengthen overall competitiveness—a motivation which implies a 
strong case for the presence of efficiency effects where the merged entity becomes a stronger and 
more-efficient competitor. Second, market-power effects will tend to be quite minimal in such 
transactions due to the overriding ambition to learn and upgrade, as the reductions in capacities 
that are essential for market-power effects are not consistent with a learning ambition. Building 
on the above foundations, we posit that cross-border investments undertaken by EM-MNEs in 
developed countries (i.e., EMDC) are more likely to generate relatively strong efficiency 
effects and relatively weak market-power effects as compared to the cross-border investments 
undertaken by DC-MNEs in emerging markets (i.e., DCEM). Thus, our third hypothesis can 
be set out as follows: 
H3: As compared to DCEM cross-border investments, EMDC cross-border investments will 
tend to be characterized by relatively strong efficiency effects and relatively weak market-power 
effects (i.e., efficiency effects will tend to dominate market-power effects). 
 
DATA & METHODOLOGY 
Variables and Estimation Strategy 
We collected data on the cross-border acquisitions materializing between 1986 and 2010 from 
Thomson Reuter’s ‘Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions’ series database. We also obtained firm-
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level sales and profit measures for all merging firms (acquirers and targets) over our sampled 
period from Thomson Reuter’s Worldscope database. Focusing on cross-border acquisitions as 
the empirical setting offers a sort of natural experiment in which to examine the market-power 
and efficiency effects associated with FDI (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Acquisitions allow 
acquirers to immediately gain ownership control over target assets and resources, thereby 
providing the appropriate pre- and post-contexts in which to examine the degree to which 
efficiency and market-power effects are realized. By its very nature, Greenfield FDI does not 
provide the pre-context counterfactual which cross-border acquisitions provide. Moreover, cross-
border acquisitions have become an increasingly prominent mode to engage in FDI over the past 
three decades, as they now constitute up to 50 percent of global FDI value (UNCTAD, 2014).  
In order to test our theoretical priors concerning the balance between market-power and 
efficiency effects in cross-border acquisition activity across the different country-pair types, we 
must first create a variable construct that captures whether market-power effects dominate 
efficiency effects in specific cross-border transactions. The Gugler et al. (2003) methodological 
approach – which focuses on the change in sales and profits for merging firms and is illustrated 
in Figure I – represents a particularly effective means to capture the relative strength of market-
power with respect to efficiency effects in cross-border investment activity. As previously 
outlined, transactions where sales decrease but profits increase tend to be characterized by 
substantial market-power effects and minimal efficiency effects. Furthermore, transactions where 
sales increase and profits decrease tend to be characterized by substantial efficiency effects and 
minimal market-power effects. Thus, the Gugler et al. (2003) methodological approach is unique 
in that it allows analyzing efficiency and market-power effects in an integrated manner.  
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In order to operationalize this approach, we must calculate post-acquisition changes in 
sales and profits for the merging firms for each particular cross-border transaction. Thus, we 
consider the weighted-average annual change in sales and profits for merging firms over the five 
years subsequent to the acquisition (i.e., for years t+1 through t+5), and then normalize this 
average with respect to industry averages over the same period. More specifically, we first 
calculate the yearly percentage change in sales and profits at both the firm and industry level 
throughout the post-acquisition period; and then calculate the yearly differences in sales and 
profit growth for both acquirers and targets with respect to the industry averages. The resulting 
yearly differentials in sales and profit growth are then summed via a weighting by firm size. For 
each period from t+1 to t+5, we then add up the weighted deviations for each firm and calculate 
the average over the available data for post-acquisition years. Via the above process, we are able 
to obtain measures of sales and profit growth relative to the average firm in the focal firm’s 
respective industry which indicates then whether the merging firms over or under perform with 
respect to their industry peers in the post-transaction period. 
Accordingly, the average changes in sales and profits for the firms sharing the same four-
digit SIC code represent the benchmarks via which we capture post-acquisition changes in sales 
and profits for merging firms. Put differently, average firm performance in the industry sets an 
additional counterfactual, as the merging firms would seemingly grow sales and profits 
somewhat in line with the typical firm in an industry in a scenario where no cross-border 
investment occurs. Equations 1 and 2 represent the respective calculations for the yearly changes 
in sales and profits which form the basis of operationalizing this methodological approach: 
  𝛥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎,𝑡    =   
     (%𝛿𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑞 −  %𝛿𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑞−𝑖𝑛𝑑) ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑞 + (%𝛿𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 −  %𝛿𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟−𝑖𝑛𝑑) ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟             
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑞 + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
    (1)        
𝛥𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎,𝑡  =  
(%𝛿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑞 −  %𝛿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑞−𝑖𝑛𝑑) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑞 + (%𝛿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟 −  %𝛿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟−𝑖𝑛𝑑) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟
    𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑞 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟
    (2) 
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Our sample includes up to 4,361 cross-border transactions with available data on sales 
and profitability to operationalize the Gugler et al. (2003) methodological approach. Moreover, 
employing this taxonomy of transaction types allows the creation of dichotomous and 
trichotomous dependent constructs that capture the market-power/efficiency tendencies of cross-
border acquisition activity. First, we create a simple dichotomous variable to capture the 
presence of transaction types where market-power effects dominate efficiency effects. In 
particular, we create a dichotomous construct that is equal to 1 when merging firms experience 
both decreased sales and increased profits (i.e., market-power dominant transactions are realized, 
as exhibited by quadrant 3 in Figure I), and equal to 0 otherwise (i.e., the transactions in the other 
three Figure I quadrants which do not indicate clear market-power dominance). Second, we 
create a trichotomous dependent construct that better takes advantage of the variation involved 
with the four different transaction types. In particular, transactions where efficiency effects 
dominate market-power effects (quadrant 2) represent the polar opposite of those where market-
power effects dominate efficiency effects (quadrant 3). Furthermore, quadrants 1 and 4 involve 
transactions where market-power and efficiency effects tend to counteract and offset; thus, 
transactions where neither effect dominates represent a middle-ground between the polar 
opposites. This ordinal categorization allows the creation of a trichotomous dependent construct 
that is set to -1 for cross-border acquisitions where efficiency effects dominate (quadrant 2), set 
to 0 for cross-border acquisitions involving indeterminate effects (quadrants 1 and 4), and set to 
1 for cross-border acquisitions where market-power effects dominate (quadrant 3). 
 In order to test our hypothesized relationships concerning the balance between efficiency 
and market-power effects across different country-pair contexts, we must categorize our sampled 
cross-border acquisitions into four different country-pair types in order to create our main 
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explanatory constructs. Specifically, we define developed (emerging-market) countries based on 
OECD (non-OECD) membership which leads to four country-pair configuration types: 
developed to emerging market (DCEM), developed to developed (DCDC), emerging market 
to developed (EMDC), and emerging market to emerging market (EMEM). In terms of the 
composition of our sample of 4,361 cross-border transactions with available data, the DCDC 
country-pair type represents 78.1% (3404) of our cross-border acquisitions, the DCEM 
country-pair type represents 15.7% (685) of our cross-border acquisitions, the EMDC country-
pair type represents 4.6% (202), and the EMEM country-pair type represents 1.6% (70). This 
sample composition is consistent with the population of cross-border acquisition activity, as DC-
MNEs dominate cross-border investment activity despite an upswing in emerging-market based 
activity in recent years (Kang and Johansson, 2000; Makaew, 2010). Since the above country-
pair configurations are mutually exclusive categories, DCEM transactions constitute the 
omitted reference category in our empirical estimations. Setting up DCEM transactions as the 
benchmark follows from the previously noted a priori regarding these cross-border investments 
being most likely to manifest substantial market-power effects. 
 We control for an additional set of factors which are likely to affect the balance between 
realized market-power and efficiency effects in order to make stronger causal inferences with 
respect to the relationship between country-pair configuration and the market-power/efficiency 
tendencies involved with cross-border acquisition activity. First, prior studies (e.g., Haleblian 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) find that acquisition experience is a salient attribute in 
predicting a firm’s ability to both learn from and transfer knowledge to target firms, thereby 
enhancing the efficiency effects involved with the acquisition (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). 
As prior-acquisition experience may influence post-acquisition outcomes, we create a control 
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variable, acquirer experience, that captures the number of targets the acquirer has purchased – 
going back to 1986 (the start of our sample period) – prior to the focal transaction. 
Second, the literature on M&A activity far too often fails to distinguish between mergers 
and acquisitions and instead employs these terms interchangeably. Conceptually, M&As can be 
thought of as residing on a continuum where targets at one end of the continuum have minimal 
post-acquisition influence on the merged entity (i.e., a true acquisition of assets and equity 
interest is taking place), and where targets at the other end of the continuum are equal partners 
with respect to the acquirer (i.e., a true merger of equals is taking place). When considering our 
sampled data, 75% of our transactions can simply be characterized as acquisitions of equity 
interest or assets in target firms, while some 25% of our transactions are characterized by 
Thomson as mergers. We should stress, however, that a number of these mergers might still be 
best characterized as acquisitions; e.g., the Daimler/Chrysler transaction was termed a merger by 
Thomson when in reality it was an acquisition by Daimler. Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
nature of the transaction (merger or acquisition) might affect the balance between market-power 
and efficiency effects. In particular, a number of scholars (e.g., Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001) report that efficiencies are most elusive when true mergers take 
place, thus mergers may be more market-power based as compared to acquisitions. We 
accordingly create a dummy variable, merger-tendency, set to 1 if the transaction is classified by 
Thomson as a merger and set to 0 otherwise—which controls for the transactions tendency 
toward being a merger of equals. 
Third, acquirer size may influence the tendency toward market-power effects manifesting 
in our sampled transactions, as larger acquirers may be better able to use these acquisitions to 
forestall competition in a market (Singh and Montgomery, 1987). For instance, large MNEs may 
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be interested in acquiring smaller firms which represent future competitive threats (Lewis, 1983); 
thus, acquirer size may yield more pronounced market-power effects in our empirical study. To 
capture the potential effects of acquirer size, we use the acquirer’s yearly sales in order to create 
the acquirer size control variable. In estimations reported to referees, we also controlled for the 
pre-acquisition efficiency level of the acquirer relative to the target; however, including this 
control variable reduced sample size by 34%. Since results employing this substantially reduced 
sample do not change qualitatively, we repress those estimations which are available from 
authors on request. Table I displays descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for all of our 
explanatory variables of interest. Note that none of the correlations are above the 0.5 benchmark 
for multi-collinearity concerns. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Turning to our empirical estimation strategy, we first employ logit regression analysis in 
order to estimate the influence of country-pair configuration on the balance between market-
power and efficiency effects in cross-border acquisition activity. The logit estimation method is 
appropriate since our dependent variable takes the value of one if the cross-border acquisition is 
defined as market-power dominant and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, one can interpret the results of 
the logit regression as yielding coefficient estimates that predict the likelihood that market-power 
dominant transactions will result. Second, we can also capture the balance between market-
power and efficiency effects in cross-border transactions via our trichotomous dependent 
construct. To analyze our trichotomous dependent variable, we employ an ordered logit 
regression. The ordered logit method is appropriate in this trichotomous context as post-
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transaction outcomes are ordered in terms of the relative strength of market-power effects vis-à-
vis efficiency effects. We also employ fixed period-specific effects (i.e., year dummies) in all of 
our estimations in order to control for any common time trends across our sampled cross-border 
acquisitions. 
 An additional estimation issue is involved with the introduction of our acquirer-size 
control variable as it contains a number of missing observations; i.e., the number of feasible 
observations drops by 336 when acquirer-size is included in the estimations. We face then a 
trade-off between having a large sample and having a rigorous estimation procedure with 
multiple controls. Our reported regressions must then strike a balance between sample size and 
the benefits of including extensive controls. For both the logit and ordered-logit regressions, we 
accordingly first report estimations that strictly involve the three control variables where the 
smaller sample is necessarily employed; we next introduce estimations that involve the three 
principal explanatory variables where the larger sample can be employed; and we then 
sequentially introduce our control variables (acquirer-experience, merger-tendency and acquirer-
size) in the three subsequent estimations involving the principal explanatory variables and where 
all possible observations are employed. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table II reports the empirical results for the five logit estimations, while Table III reports the 
results for the five ordered-logit estimations. The different country-pair configurations represent 
the explanatory constructs of principal interest. While our focus is on the empirical results for the 
constructs capturing our three hypothesized relationships, we briefly discuss here the results for 
our control variables. First, acquirer-experience does not appear to significantly affect the 
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balance between market-power and efficiency effects in cross-border investment activity, as only 
in Model 4 of Table III does it yield a significant coefficient estimate. Second, the merger-
tendency construct also exhibits a consistent lack of significance in both tables, thus suggesting 
that transaction type (merger or acquisition) does not yield significant differences in terms of the 
balance between market-power and efficiency effects. As already noted, this result might be 
driven by the majority of our ‘mergers’ actually being ‘acquisitions’ in nature; i.e., even with 
mergers, it is the acquiring firms which tend to call the shots. Third, the acquirer-size construct – 
which limits the sample – appears to positively and significantly enhance the market-power 
tendencies of transactions in both the logit (Table II) and ordered logit (Table III) estimations. 
Consequently, the larger the acquirer in a cross-border acquisition the more likely is it that 
market-power effects dominate efficiency effects. We turn now to a discussion of the empirical 
results for our explanatory variables of principal interest. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II & III ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Our first hypothesis predicted that cross-border transactions involving developed-country 
acquirers and targets (DCDC) would tend to be characterized by relatively strong efficiency 
effects and relatively weak market-power effects as compared to the cross-border transactions 
involving developed-country acquirers of emerging-market targets (DCEM). The empirical 
results for the logit estimations reported in table II fail to support this hypothesis, as the 
coefficient estimates are consistently insignificant across the different model estimations. In 
addition, the empirical results for the ordered-logit estimations reported in table III also yield 
insignificant coefficient estimates across the different model estimations. Accordingly, our 
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empirical results indicate that cross-border acquisitions of developed-country targets undertaken 
by developed-country acquirers tend to be no different in terms of the balance between market-
power and efficiency effects when compared with the cross-border acquisitions taking place 
between developed-country acquirers and emerging-market targets.  
Our second hypothesis predicted that cross-border transactions involving emerging-
market acquirers and targets (EMEM) would tend to be characterized by relatively strong 
efficiency effects and relatively weak market-power effects as compared to the cross-border 
transactions involving developed-country acquirers of emerging-market targets (DCEM). The 
empirical results for the logit estimations reported in table II yield some support for this 
hypothesis, as the coefficient estimates for EMEM transactions are significant and negative 
per prediction in three estimations (Models 2, 3 & 4). The EMEM coefficient estimate does, 
however, become insignificant in Model 5 when the acquirer-size construct is introduced—a 
control which also drops sample size. The empirical results for the ordered-logit estimations 
reported in table III yield similar results, as the coefficient estimates for EMEM transactions 
are again significant in Models 2, 3 and 4 and insignificant in the Model 5 estimation. 
Accordingly, our empirical results provide partial support for the a priori captured in hypothesis 
2 that cross-border acquisitions of emerging-market targets undertaken by emerging-market 
acquirers will tend to be characterized by stronger efficiency effects and weaker market-power 
effects when compared to the cross-border acquisitions taking place between developed-country 
acquirers and emerging-market targets. 
Our third hypothesis predicted that cross-border transactions involving emerging-market 
acquirers and developed-country targets (EMDC) would tend to be characterized by relatively 
strong efficiency effects and relatively weak market-power effects as compared to the cross-
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border transactions involving developed-country acquirers of emerging-market targets 
(DCEM). The empirical results for the logit estimations reported in table II yield strong 
support for this hypothesis, as the coefficient estimates are consistently significant and negative 
per prediction across all of the estimations. For instance, the coefficient estimate for EMDC in 
model 5 – where all control variables are included – is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Furthermore, calculating the marginal effect for this most-conservative coefficient 
estimate suggests that such transactions are 11.5% less likely to be market-power dominant as 
compared to DCEM cross-border transactions. The ordered-logit estimations in table III also 
yield consistent support for the substantial presence of efficiency-effects in EMDC cross-
border transactions, as the coefficient estimates in these five estimations are all negative and 
significant. Calculating the marginal effect of the coefficient estimate of -0.372 for EMDC in 
model 5 (where all control variables are included) suggests that EMDC transactions are 8.3% 
less likely to be market-power dominant as compared to DCEM cross-border transactions. 
Accordingly, our empirical results provide strong support for the prior that cross-border 
acquisitions of developed-country targets undertaken by emerging-market acquirers tend to be 
characterized by relatively-large efficiency effects and relatively-small market-power effects 
when compared with the cross-border acquisitions taking place between developed-country 
acquirers and emerging-market targets. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
As FDI growth has outstripped that of cross-border trade in recent decades, research on the 
welfare implications of MNE activity has become a vibrant topic in many disciplines. The 
foundational IB literature wrestled with the fact that FDI is potentially a double-edged sword as 
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it can replace imperfect markets with efficient internal mechanisms (as in internalization theory), 
generate more opportunities for value co-creation via more efficient transmission of valuable 
tacit knowledge (as in the organizational capability view), but also possibly lead to the reaping of 
oligopolistic rents via reduced competition (as in the market-power view). Yet despite these 
foundations, contemporary IB scholarship tends to gravitate towards the efficiency interpretation 
of the MNE. Hence, the aim of our study was to evaluate the balance between the market-power 
and efficiency effects associated with contemporary cross-border investment activities.  
Our principal finding is that the market-power and efficiency effects involved with cross-
border investment activity manifest heterogeneity in the cross-national context for FDI. In 
particular, by classifying our sample of cross-border investments into different country-pair 
configurations, we generate empirical results that conform to some of the priors in the 
foundational IB scholarship. Specifically, early IB scholarship (e.g., Hymer, 1970, 1971; Lall, 
1978, 1979) posited that cross-border investments undertaken by emerging-market MNEs would 
be more beneficial than the investments undertaken by developed-country MNEs. In line with 
these priors, our empirical analysis first strongly supports that acquisitions of developed-country 
firms by EM-MNEs tend to involve relatively strong efficiency effects and relatively weak 
market-power effects when compared with the cross-border investments by DC-MNEs in 
emerging markets. Second, our empirical analysis partially supports that acquisitions of 
emerging-market firms by EM-MNEs tend to involve relatively strong efficiency effects and 
relatively weak market-power effects when compared with the cross-border investments by DC-
MNEs in emerging markets. 
This study also informs the rich literature on multinationality-performance (Yang et al., 
2013). Specifically, one of the main arguments for positing a positive association between 
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multinationality and performance is that MNEs can amortize their fixed costs in R&D and brand 
value by gaining a larger market via international diversification (Hennart, 2007). Implicitly, 
these scholars build on the efficiency view by assuming that MNEs expand firm boundaries 
across borders – hence multinationality – when internalization generates efficient organization of 
transactions thus leading to positive performance consequences. Our study suggests that a 
complementary logic leading to the same outcome would be that the market-power gained 
through international diversification would also lead to a positive relationship between 
multinationality and performance. In other words, the mechanism linking the explanatory 
variable (i.e., multinationality) with the dependent variable (i.e., performance) is not only 
animated by extended scale and scope accrued through superior efficiency vis-à-vis competitors, 
but also via the increased market power attained through attenuating effective competition. 
In terms of practical implications, our study speaks to the controversies surrounding the 
recent uptick in investment activity by EM-MNEs in developed countries. In particular, EM-
MNEs have faced a good deal of host-country opposition in response to their increased proclivity 
to acquire developed-country assets and firms. High profile cases include China National 
Offshore Oil Company’s (CNOOC) $18.5 billion bid for Unocal – a mid-sized U.S oil company 
– in 2004, and Haier’s $2.5 billion bid for Maytag – a U.S white-goods manufacturer – in 2005. 
Both bids were met by fierce political opposition despite the fact that U.S. officials had a 
difficult time articulating why this was not in the public interest and a difficult time refuting the 
Chinese outcry regarding double standards (The Economist, 2005). Our results suggest that the 
controversies and opposition to increased investment activity by EM-MNEs in developed 
countries may be shortsighted. At least from a consumer-welfare perspective, it appears that the 
investments by EM-MNEs in developed countries are far less market-power based as compared 
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to the traditional investments by DC-MNEs. In fact, our analysis indicates that, if anything, 
public policy should incentivize and encourage cross-border investments by EM-MNEs; or at the 
very least, this investment activity should be treated according to the same standards that cross-
border investments by DC-MNEs are subjected to.  
Our study, nevertheless, involves a number of limitations which provide scope for future 
research. Most obviously, we recognize that methods may exist in which to separately estimate 
efficiency and market-power effects. For instance, labor-productivity upgrading represents an 
intuitive means to capture efficiency effects in multinational enterprises; furthermore, total factor 
productivity, structural estimations, and even earnings per employee represent alternative 
approaches to capture efficiency effects (e.g., Haskel et al., 2007). In addition, alternatives may 
exist with regard to specifically capturing market-power effects: e.g., the event-study method, 
industry-level price changes, and estimation of price-cost markups (Clougherty and Duso, 2011). 
We encourage future empirical scholarship that examines the efficiency and market-power 
tendencies of MNEs via such methodological approaches so as to establish the robustness and 
boundary conditions of our findings. Furthermore, future scholarship which explicitly links the 
impact of internationalization motives (e.g., Benito, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015) on the 
balance between market-power and efficiency effects is also called for. Lastly, we envision 
scholarship which considers the market-power and efficiency effects involved with other modes 
of FDI (e.g., Greenfields), as outcomes may be substantially different across different FDI modes 
(Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). While cross-border acquisitions represent a substantial portion of 
contemporary FDI, it is essential that future scholarship examines market-power and efficiency 
effects across all forms of FDI in order to offer a more comprehensive understanding.  
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Despite the above limitations, our study contributes to the IB literature by empirically 
evaluating in a comprehensive manner the balance between market-power and efficiency effects 
in cross-border acquisition activity. We demonstrate that heterogeneity exists in the cross-
national environment for FDI, as investments undertaken by EM-MNEs tend to involve less 
market-power and greater efficiency effects as compared to the traditional investments 
undertaken by DC-MNEs. Taken together, our analysis suggests that both efficiency and market-
power effects should be prominent in the study of MNEs and FDI. Indeed, re-integrating market-
power insights into contemporary IB research may offer fruitful avenues for future research that 
more comprehensively factors the totality of MNE effects. We hope our analysis will spur 
scholars to increasingly consider the full implications of FDI so as to enhance the 
epistemological and practical relevance of our academic endeavors.   
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Figure I. Taxonomy of Transaction Types 
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TABLE I: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
      Variables    N  Mean   S.D.     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
1. DC→EM 4361 0.16 0.36 1.00       
2. DC→DC 4361 0.78 0.41 -0.85 1.00       
3. EM→EM 4361 0.02 0.13 -0.03 -0.18 1.00     
4. EM→DC 4361 0.05 0.21 -0.07 -0.41 -0.01 1.00    
5. Acquirer-Experience 4361 3.56 5.12 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 1.00   
6. Merger-Tendency 4361 0.24 0.43 -0.19 0.17 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 1.00  
7. Acquirer-Size 4025 15.62 2.75 0.14 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 0.51 -0.13 1.00 
Note: The number of feasible observations drops by 336 when acquirer-size is included in the estimations due to missing values for annual 
sales. 
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Table II: Logit Regression Results 
Model      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5) 
      
DC→DC  -0.135 -0.121 -0.130 -0.035 
  (0.103) (0.101) (0.102) (0.096) 
      
EM→EM  -0.688*** -0.639** -0.640** -0.065 
  (0.243) (0.264) (0.264) (0.289) 
      
EM→DC  -0.757*** -0.697*** -0.704*** -0.518*** 
  (0.214) (0.197) (0.194) (0.200) 
      
Acquirer- -0.014  0.017 0.018 -0.015 
Experience (0.014)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) 
      
Merger- 0.068   0.035 0.075 
Tendency (0.094)   (0.086) (0.091) 
      
Acquirer-Size 0.130***    0.127*** 
 (0.017)    (0.016) 
      
Constant -2.276*** -0.210** -0.243*** -0.244*** -2.195*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.093) (0.093) (0.254) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.025 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.026 
Observations 4025 4361 4361 4361 4025 
      
Notes: Columns 1 through 5 report Logit estimations based on a dichotomous dependent construct that is equal to 1 when merging firms 
experience both decreased sales and increased profits (i.e., market-power dominant cross-border acquisitions are realized), and equal to 0 
otherwise. Furthermore, the explanatory constructs include: DCDC (acquisitions undertaken by developed-country MNEs in other 
developed countries), EMEM (acquisitions undertaken by emerging-market MNEs in other emerging markets), EMDC 
(acquisitions by emerging-market MNEs in developed countries), Acquirer-Experience (the number of targets the acquirer has purchased 
going back to 1986), Merger-Tendency (set to 1 if the transaction is classified by Thomson as a merger and set to 0 otherwise), 
Acquirer-Size (yearly sales), and year dummies to capture period-specific effects. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
represented by ***,**,* respectively. 
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Table III: Ordered Logit Regression Results 
Model      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5) 
      
DC→DC  -0.103 -0.084 -0.090 0.029 
  (0.107) (0.104) (0.105) (0.099) 
      
EM→EM  -0.639** -0.568** -0.569** -0.010 
  (0.263) (0.270) (0.270) (0.302) 
      
EM→DC  -0.675*** -0.587*** -0.592*** -0.372** 
  (0.239) (0.221) (0.215) (0.189) 
      
Acquirer- -0.007  0.025 0.025* -0.009 
Experience (0.009)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) 
      
Merger- 0.062   0.025 0.057 
Tendency (0.083)   (0.078) (0.081) 
      
Acquirer-Size 0.135***    0.134*** 
 (0.016)    (0.015) 
      
Cut 1      
Constant -0.516** -2.555*** -2.514*** -2.514*** -0.514** 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.117) (0.117) (0.231) 
Cut 2      
Constant 2.394*** 0.251** 0.300*** 0.300*** 2.400*** 
 (0.0234) (0.098) (0.092) (0.092) (0.236) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.023 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.024 
Observations 4025 4361 4361 4361 4025 
      
Notes: Columns 1 through 5 report Ordered Logit estimations based on a trichotomous dependent construct that is set to -1 for cross-border 
acquisitions where efficiency effects dominate market-power effects, set to 0 for cross-border acquisitions involving indeterminate 
effects, and set to 1 for cross-border acquisitions where market-power effects dominate efficiency effects. Furthermore, the explanatory 
constructs include: DCDC (acquisitions undertaken by developed-country MNEs in other developed countries), EMEM 
(acquisitions undertaken by emerging-market MNEs in other emerging markets), EMDC (acquisitions by emerging-market MNEs in 
developed countries), Acquirer-Experience (the number of targets the acquirer has purchased going back to 1986), Merger-Tendency (set 
to 1 if the transaction is classified by Thomson as a merger and set to 0 otherwise), Acquirer-Size (yearly sales), and year dummies to 
capture period-specific effects. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is represented by ***,**,* respectively. 
 
